On Tuesday February 7, 1995 William Broad of the New York Times made the first public report of the characteristics and capabilities of a secret submarine which was launched by the Navy on Jan 25 1969. The submarine was first announced by President Lyndon Johnson on April 18 1965. One week earlier Admiral Hyman G. Rickover had met with Admiral Levering Smith the Director of the Special Projects Office which managed the development of the Polaris Fleet Ballistic Missile System, Dr John Craven Chief Scientist of that program and director of the Navy's new deep submergence systems project, and Robert Morse the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and Development. The decision to build NR-1 was made at that meeting. A few weeks before that Craven had received a call from Admiral Wilkenson, the first commanding officer of the submarine Nautilus. Admiral Wilkenson reminded Craven of a study he had sponsored to examine the potential of a small nuclear powered deep diving research submersible. He indicated that he and Admiral Rickover felt that they could produce a nuclear reactor for such a vehicle and that they were enthusiastic about the concept (so much so that the vehicle was called NR-1 in honor of the nuclear reactor division). Wilkenson asked if Craven were interested in being project manager. His affirmative answer led to the historic meeting. Mr. Broad is generous in his praise of this very technological sophisticated, reliable and operationally successful vehicle. Perhaps more incredible was the management techniques employed by Rickover and Craven which effectuated the launch this vehicle less than four years after the date of its conception. The approach which was to assign complete responsibility and accountability to the project managers and to 'give them their head' was roundly criticized at the time and is roundly disbelieved today. Even before the NR-1 was launched the Ceneral Acounting Office issued a scathing report vis-a vis the management techniques. It began with the statement that "unfortunately we can not find anything illegal about the management of this program" as they regarded it cavalier and irresponsible. Admiral Rickover produced the Navy's official response to this criticism.

His one page letter response to the voluminous report says "this report puts me in mind of the review od D. H. Lawrence's review of Lady Chatterly's lover which appeared in the November 1959 issue of Field and Stream

This fictional account of the day-by-day life of an English gamekeeper is still of considerable interest to outdoor-minded readers, as it contains many passages on pheasant raising, the apprehending of poachers, ways to control vermin, and other chores and duties of the professional gamekeeper. Unfortunately, one is obliged to wade through many pages of extraneous material in order to discover and savor these sidelights on the management of a Midlands shooting estate, and in this reviewer's opinion this book cannot take the place of J.R. Miller's Practical Gamekeeping. It is evident to me that the reviewer lacked comprehension of the primary occupation of the gamekeeper... A cursory review of the subject report leads me to conclude that its authors likewise, lack comprehension in the manner of-accomplishing Research and Development. Therefore, I believe no useful purpose would be served by detailed comments on my part."

Craven concurred with the report, the GAO had nothing more to say.

The management of Common Heritage Corp. has not changed its ways. If you do not care to have your environmentally sustainable development appear in your lifetime but you want it to look like it is well managed you are advised to seek help elsewhere. But if you want another miracle of performance and schedule give us a call, a contract and stand back, success is on the way.